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Writing an Important Body of Scholarship:
A Proposal for an Embodied Rhetoric

of Professional Practice
Jane E. Hindman

I begin my reasoning and reflecting (as I almost always do) in the throes
of contradiction. On this occasion, the inconsistency concerns our profes
sional standing. I'm not gesturing to the oft-mentioned conflict between

our institutional status as gatekeepers of Standard Written English and
our disciplinary claim to be oppositional intellectuals. That paradox does
indeed deserve attention and plays a significant role in my inquiry, but as
a point of departure I want to explore a puzzling discrepancy between the
content of our disciplinary arguments and the discursive moves that
enable them. My hope is that the exploration will reveal the ideological
constraints of the abstract, rationalist, disembodied rhetoric our profes
sion usually demands. Since it is by definition constrained by the logic of
noncontradiction and by professional standards, that rhetoric mystifies
the professional practices that authorize it.
Such mystification of our discourse renders us vulnerable to Jack
Selzer's charge that "the relationship of rhetorical events to the material

world that sustains and produces them has not often enough been fully
elaborated or clearly articulated" (9). Like other authors in Selzer and

Crowley's Rhetorical Bodies?a collection that attempts to "steer rheto
ric more firmly in the direction of those elaborations and articulations"?

I too witness the need for a more "material rhetoric" (9).
More specifically, and like Yameng Liu's contribution to the collec

tion, I am predisposed to focus on what Foucault describes as the
prohibitive procedures that allow?in fact, demand?discourse "to evade
its ponderous, awesome materiality" and ensure that "we do not have the

right to say everything" (216). Liu's specific analysis uncovers the
discursive procedures by which the media determine the public' s percep
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tion that Dick Morris's most serious ethical lapse is "neither his involve
ment in the sex scandal nor even his betrayal of trust, but his flagrant
transgression of established political, ideological, and ultimately rhetori
cal boundaries" (315). This determination of Morris' ethics, Liu argues,
results from the ideology of journalistic coverage that demands partisan
control of rhetorical skills and distinct reverence for the demarcation
between either/or; in journalistic discourse, that ideology functions as "a

key mechanism in regulating the deployment and movement of human
resources in contemporary rhetorical practices" (316).
Liu's insightful conclusions regarding the prohibitions on material

ity in journalistic discourse clearly describe the partisan, rationalist
ideology denying materiality and informing the discourse I will consider.
But unlike Liu or any of the contributors to Rhetorical Bodies, I ask us to

turn our critical gaze to our own professional discursive practice. By
professional discursive practice, I mean the entextualization involved in
what we do as professionals: reading, writing, and evaluating students'
and our own discourse(s). Excluding those occasions when what we
profess is technical and/or "professional" writing and/or "creative"
writing, the practices I want to consider are those in which we produce and

consume academic discourse in our capacities as professional rhetori
cians and compositionists as well as the material conditions that authorize
that discourse. I hope to show that, like the journalistic discourse Liu
considers, our scholarship authorizes a peculiarly restrictive and abstract

ideology and that "regulation of the flqw of embodied rhetorical re
sources" is that ideology's "characteristic mode of operation" (317).
My argument requires two moves. First, I will identify a specific set
of our professional discursive practices, those that not only support Shari
Benstock's claim that "the question of' genre' often rides on the question
of gender" but that also disable efforts to institute change in the academy

(148).1 Second, as antidote to these gendered power relations, I will
propose "embodied rhetoric," a rhetoric characterized and authorized in
part by specific sorts of "personal" author- and context-saturated gestures

to everyday life that replace or supplement our conventional discursive
gestures to an always already constituted authority. I initiate my concep
tion of an embodied rhetoric with Nancy Miller's notion of "personal
criticism" (in part to emphasize the "criticism" crucial to the discursive
style I propose and in part to be specific in my use of the commonly over
determined term "personal") and then build on Miller's original concep
tion of personal criticism in three crucial ways. Finally?and in order to
demonstrate how one can embody the rhetoric, the ideology, the affect,
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the contradictions our profession demands?I will gesture to the events
that precipitated this argument. I hope to convince you that an embodied

rhetoric, one that gestures to autobiographical as well as disciplinary
authority, not only accounts for the contradictions inherent in ponderous

materiality but also loosens the rhetorical constraints hindering our
adapting to the exigencies and contingencies of our profession. Embod

ied rhetoric regenders academic discursive practice and thus assures
agency and power to feminist theory and praxis. By implication, then,
it also facilitates our efforts to effect change in our own and in our

students' lives.

Ideological Constraints in Professional Rhetoric
I began by declaring a puzzling discrepancy between the content of our

disciplinary arguments and the discursive moves that enable them.
Consider, for example, the last decade's proliferation in composition
studies of well-respected arguments dismissing foundationalist claims to

knowledge about writing and the composing process, advocating
constructivist views of the inherently social nature of that process, and

explaining how anti-foundationalist theory can inform our classroom
practice. Indeed, this latter feature of rhetoric and composition's specific

"body of knowledge"?namely, the capacity to marry theory and prac

tice?either always has been or has come to be seen as its distinctive
quality. Sharon Crowley has argued that "because composition cheer
fully operates without a founding theory, it has never generated a readily
identifiable discipline" (192). Yet, such cheerful operation becomes less

and less possible as composition achieves legitimate disciplinary status.
Such status secures not just individual jobs but also a collective place in
the institution, as well as the authority to speak as professionals. Securing
a legitimate territory is the aim of the process of professionalization;
legitimation is always already any profession's "will to truth," a term

Foucault uses to describe a particular aspect of discursive prohibition?
namely, the opposition between true and false. Resolving the legitimation

crisis provokes any profession's defining and protecting the boundaries
of its self-professed and discrete body of knowledge, its system for
determining merit, its procedures for generating new knowledge, and its
process for reproducing authority.

Composition's specific will to truth, as Lynn Worsham argues,
materializes in its particular "epistemological attitude" and its "peda
gogical imperative" ("Writing" 98). The profession's epistemology, she
explains, appears to be "both transpersonal and objective" but is actually
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"based on subjective needs and desires," while its "will to pedagogy"
requires "every theory of writing to translate into a pedagogical practice

or at least some specific advice for teachers" (83,96). These are both
institutionally created, sanctioned and maintained practices, require
ments that academic authors must satisfy if they wish to authorize their

professional discourse. Hence, while it may indeed be the case that
composition has no founding theory per se, we seem at the very least to
have a founding faith, a self-professed creed: producing and consuming
writing theory?that is, the newest and best of the profession's important

body of knowledge?improves (if not confers) one's capacity not just to
theorize about but also to teach composition well. This faith sustains our

expertise and our discipline as not simply a "service" requiring no
theoretical grounding or academic rigor; nor is it an abstraction
disconnected from the social realities of writing bodies. Clearly,
rhetoric and composition studies is "about" the marriage of theory and

practice. It has to be.
Nonetheless, and as Stanley Fish has relentlessly reminded us,
linking composition studies with an anti-foundationalist position?and,
by implication, with any particular theoretical position?can "bring with
itno pedagogical payoff; [likewise] being opposed to anti-foundationalism
[or any theoretical position] entails no pedagogical penalty," for there is,
"as James Reither observes, no transition from 'knowing that' to 'know
ing how'" (335). Indeed, our discrete body of knowledge?the nature of

rhetoric and its procedures as well as the most effective and ethical
methods for teaching that supposedly unattainable transition?have
perplexed philosophers and practitioners for eons. In fact, the particular
practices manifesting composition's will to truth reenact the long quarrel

between rhetoric and philosophy. Ironically, these same practices also
sustain not just a "hostility to rhetoric" but also an "anti-professional
ism," labels that Fish gives to the desire that "enforces a distinction
between professional labors on the one hand and the identification and
promotion of what is true or valuable on the other" (215). Thus, our
discipline' s marriage of convenience makes for uneasy bedfellows, for its

consummation is logically impossible.
It's not rhetorically impossible, however. In fact, the "will to peda
gogy" necessitates that rhetorical move?which, it would seem, is made
but not recognized, practiced but not allowed. "Why has the field of
composition disallowed such a discourse?" asks Victor Vitanza, for
whom exploring the mystification informing the field's interests and
practices is crucial. Vitanza recognizes that such a discourse would
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require innovative rhetorical practices, "uncanny criticisms ... with the
sole purpose of establishing the (postmodern) conditions for the possi
bilities of discourse in and about writing theory and pedagogy"; it would
necessitate conceiving a professional discourse that "requires itself to

bear witness to what has been disallowed" (139). Likewise recognizing
the need for innovation in professional discursive practice, Lynn Worsham
invites a rhetoric of theory, a "rhetoric of inquiry [that] goes further than

the deconstructive insight that the rhetorical or tropological dimension of

language undermines straightforward grammatical meaning" and moves

toward intervention into discursive practices through "a new
metalanguage" that describes "theory as a set of tropes that structure

inquiry" and that "redescribes the humanities and social sciences in
rhetorical terms" ("Rhetoric" 393).
To my mind, the rhetorical turn that Worsham and Vitanza advocate
becomes possible through rhetorical analyses of how we as professionals
"do" theory, how our professional practices drive the discipline. Such
analysis requires studying not just the teaching of writing as a means for
transcribing thoughts but also our scholarly, administrative, teacherly
rhetoric as a method of inventing and judging and interpreting episte

mologies. Composition studies, Worsham tells us, "offers an especially
productive place for studying the many ways a field constitutes itself
rhetorically?in general, through strategies of invention, judgment, and
argumentation" ("Rhetoric" 395). As scholars, we compositionists can
offer this productivity in part because our process of professionalization

is so recent and in part because writing itself?as Foucault well docu
ments?is central to the technology of disciplinary procedures. Worsham
explains that not just social space and knowledge fields but even "what
we take to be the most private and personal of phenomena?emotion and
the body?are effects of social organization and are made available for

public administration through the techniques of discipline"; thus, in
order "to understand the discipline that has evolved to study and teach
writing, we must understand the way it works at both the semantic and

affective levels to produce and organize knowledge and experience"

("Rhetoric" 397).

I agree wholeheartedly with her conclusion that "what is needed is a

feminist critique of the disciplinary discourse of composition studies."
As my particular method of answering Worsham's call to "challenge the
claim that through the appropriation of various theories and approaches
the field escapes the disciplinary apparatus of modern patriarchal soci

ety," I will explore the construction and perpetuation of academic
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authority itself ("Rhetoric" 398). My purpose will be to make visible the
source of the legitimacy of what we do as compositionists and uncover the
possibilities for feminist agency in our practices as professional academ
ics. To that end, let me turn to feminist autobiography theorist Shari
Benstock's claim regarding the interface of genre and gender and to my

ensuing charge that our professional discourse and practice are
"masculinist" and therefore confining. Conventionally, ubiquitously,
and, of course, regardless of the biological gender of its author, the
figuring of this academic discourse is masculinist: it is represented and
taught as if it were coherent, method(olog)ical, articulate, consistent,
democratic (or at least impartial and consensual), and, most importantly,
rational. Further, our theorizing of this academic discourse has histori
cally, persistently, and blindly been considered the necessary, provoca
tive, and generative impetus to our pedagogical and scholarly practices.
We professionals recognize that these representations are not entirely
accurate. Indeed, within the pages of our professional journals, review

ers' reports, and peer evaluations we debate?sometimes vehemently?
the (anti)foundational, (a)rhetorical, (in)accurate nature of such claims
about our discourse. Probably the most effectual efforts to revise the
disciplinary response to what Worsham has termed the field' s "pedagogi

cal imperative" have been feminist arguments for "a nonoppressive,
dialogic relationship between theory and practice" (Ede 327), for a
"postdisciplinary" notion of the relationship between teaching and theory
(see Harkin). This enterprise has yet to have much of an effect on the
discipline, however. We persist (sometimes to ourselves, usually to other
professionals, and almost without exception to our first-year composition

students) in our representations of academic discourse as a more or less
transparent and intellectually superior technology best suited to a disin
terested, objective pursuit of truth. This masculinist figuration of our

discourse inscribes what Pierre Bourdieu terms "misrecognition," a
voluntary, culturally endorsed process that creates "a truth whose sole
meaning and function are to deny a truth known and recognized by all, a
lie which would deceive no one were not everyone determine to deceive

[her or] himself (133).
Misrecognition is, of course, instrumental to sustaining the status of
a profession(al): it's the strong will of professionalization that inextrica
bly links our status as a legitimate discipline to our strong will to be the
disciplinarians of (and disciplined by) our profession. As Magali Larson
explains in The Rise of Professionalism, "The singular characteristic of
professional power [is]... that the profession has the exclusive privilege
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of defining both the content of its knowledge and the legitimate condi
tions of access to it, while the unequal distribution of knowledge protects
and enhances this power" (48). Further characteristics of the professional
project, Larson tells us, are its production of "at least a minimal sense of

the cognitive superiority ... which distinguishes all... [professionals]
from the laity" and its tendency toward the "monopolization of status and

work privileges in an occupational hierarchy" (47, 51). Finally, it is
"ideologically necessary for the legitimation of monopoly that instruc

tion?the acquisition of competence?appear to be accessible to all who
seek it and are able to assimilate it" (51). This ideological cover serves to
protect and enhance the inequity in status that professionalization con
structs, for as professionals our business is to define and control legiti

mate access (our "gatekeeping" function) to the knowledge that we
construct and authorize (our scholarly function). Thus, according to

Larson's perspective anyway, the mystification that comprises
misrecognition also defines professionalism?at least in part.2
Vitanza rightly identifies the source of compositionists' most crucial

professional misrecognitions: "(1) the will to systematize (the) language
(of composing), (2) the will to be its author(ity), and (3) the will to teach

it to students" (140). But he's overly hasty in assuming that these
characteristics emerge singularly and/or only from "the strong will of the

field of composition," for, at least in one sense, this institutionalized
denial and/or (mis)recognition is not unusual or discipline-specific (140).
In fact, it's commonplace not only in the academy but throughout our
capitalist economy. (As a particularly poignant example, consider that at
the time of this writing, our nation as it is embodied in the president urges

us to (mis)recognize Osama bin Laden and the Taliban as "pure evil" and
to deny earlier U.S. political interests in collaborating with both and thus
providing their military and intelligence training.) Our profession?like
all others?is self-professed, self-constructed, self-affirmed, self-admin
istered; in other words, ours is an autobiographical profession. In order
to maintain our status as professionals, however, even we rhetoricians
concerned with de-mystifying language use cannot fully recognize the
autobiographical construction of our profession and its authority. Thus,
Vitanza is again correct when he speculates about composition's reasons
for disallowing such a critical in(ter)vention as the "perverse comedy"
that he recommends: that sort of alternative rhetoric would indeed "place
the field in the midst of a 'legitimation crisis'" (140). Bearing witness to
our own rhetoricity acknowledges the self-construction of our knowledge
as well as our efforts to demonstrate cognitive superiority. Thus, in order
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to avoid such a legitimation crisis, we?like all professionals, particu

larly those whose status is questionable or fledgling?compose an
authority that appears to be removed from its material sources in our

professional practice. Like other professionals, we systematically and
systemically reroute our professional authority from the transient, con

textual vicissitudes of our everyday practices and corporeal selves to an
already constituted and abstract realm of disciplinary subjects, linguistic
patterns, and texts.
Within our professional discursive practices, this detour is enabled
by the gesture, a rhetorical move that shifts authority away from the

"inside" of our material contexts, to the "outside" of our discursive
conventions. Under the cover of various discursive gestures, we simulta

neously invoke that always already constituted disciplinary realm of
methodologies, subjects, territories, genres, structures, and stylistic con
ventions of our discipline and disavow the transient, material realm of
professional practice(s) and corporeal producers of texts. For instance, I
enable the discourse I present now by gesturing to existing bodies of
scholarship (autobiography theory by Shari Benstock and Nancy Miller

as well as sociological analysis of professionalism by Magali Larson);
similarly, I noted the already constituted project of demonstrating gender

inequity in discourse and practice. I definitely did not gesture to my
experiences with, or to my anger and frustration resulting from, these

inequities. I have authorized (in the abstract) those experiences and
affective responses by gesturing to another scholar's accepted work with
"the personal" and by using her term "personal criticism" to assure you
that I'll focus on the "critical" more than the "personal" aspects of the

personal. (In the specific, however, I have not gestured to those experi

ences or feelings?not yet anyway.) Most convincingly, perhaps, my
references to "deficiency," to something lacking, in the collection Rhe
torical Bodies and in the work of Miller and Vitanza make my argument
possible, for therein I deploy the ultimate academic (masculinist) gesture:
pointing out a lack that my superior mastery will fill.
As you can see, conventional academic discourse works to entextualize

an abstract body of knowledge and disembody the individual writer
because it requires gestures to those methodologies, subjects, territories,

genres, structures, stylistic conventions and?of course?ideologies of
our discipline. Historically, paternalistically, conventionally, we have
been disciplined to see, as Joseph Harris does, "something peculiar about
downplaying a sense of'mastery' through calling attention to one's self
(52). By definition, then, our discourse cannot be subversive or counter
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hegemonic or interventional, for it is doggedly determined to be arhetorical.

In exchanging positionality for certainty, contingent truth for profes
sional ideology, we deny the rhetoricity of our own language. When we
misrecognize our gestures, when we deny the collective but nonetheless
self-constructed and self-authorized character of disciplinary authority,
we sentence ourselves to the discipline of the master narrative, to the

discomfiting position of being rhetoricians who are hostile to (our
own) rhetoric.
This institutionally misrecognized discursive practice co-opts the
feminist project even as it appears to sponsor it. Consider, for instance,
the past five years or so of the discipline' s apparent and extensive support

for numerous theoretical explorations of feminism's implications for

composition theory, methodology, and practice?as evidenced, for ex
ample, in such volumes as Feminism and Composition Studies, Ethical

Dilemmas in Feminist Research, Feminisms and Critical Pedagogy.
Despite their existence and even widespread acceptance, these feminists'
discursive attempts to appropriate political agency and reinscribe profes

sional practices and identities have tended to be disembodied and
therefore disempowered, without access to experiential, autobiographi
cal authority.
Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford allude to this conundrum in "Writing
Back," their invited response to a section ("Exploring Discontinuities")
of Feminism and Composition Studies. "What significance, if any," they
ask, "should we (or other readers) attach to the fact that your essays tend
to accept and embody, rather than to transgress, the conventions of
traditional academic prose? Does this acceptance and embodiment mark
a place of paradox and difficulty or does it represent a judicious response
to your specific rhetorical situations... ?" (318-19). My hunch is that this
sagacious question is more complex than its either-or articulation sug
gests, for the answer to the second question is "both." For instance, unless
she has been granted the license of well-known critics such as Helene

Cixous or Jane Tompkins, a feminist scholar's "judicious response" to
most if not all rhetorical situations in which she hopes to be published
(particularly by the MLA, the publisher of Feminism and Composition
Studies) is to rely on the conventions of academic prose, and that response
can and does simultaneously "mark a place of paradox and difficulty."
Nonetheless, the fact that here and now I am using traditional academic
prose does not necessarily mean I accept it, nor does it mean I embody it
in a literal sense. It appears, then, that when Ede and Lunsford refer to

those who "tend to embody" the "conventions of traditional academic
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prose," they are figuring those authors as talking heads: I am in their sense

"embodying" academic prose, but what my physical, determinate body
now enunciates is unbeknownst to you. In fact, you probably weren't even
recognizing my body until I brought it up, until I ask you to imagine what

I'm doing as I write. (Am I frightened/exhilarated/aroused when I point
out Ede and Lunsford's (mis)use of either-or language? Is my adrenaline
pumping? Am I sweating and swearing as I write? Does my stomach hurt?
Am I a straight female? How do I look? Am I dressed? Not?)
When we do not acknowledge the material conditions of all features

of our bodies and our "selves" at practice, we undermine feminist

revisions of discourse. We make it impossible to heed calls like
Worsham's?one that asks us to "expand our notions of literacy to their
widest possible circumference, to a point where literacy must involve us,
and our students, in more than an epistemic relation to the world and to
the earth" ("Writing"101). This avowed feminist revision is not the only

casualty of an arhetorical approach to academic discourse: such
misrecognition also incapacitates the project of subverting oppressive
power regimes, a form of literacy that Min-Zhan Lu has called "critical
affirmation" and that relies on "mark[ing] writing, especially personal
narratives, as a site for reflecting on and revising one's sense of self, one's
relations with others, and the conditions of one's life" (173).
We can see then that not j ust feminist goals of regendering masculinist

practices but also our discipline's epistemology is at stake in recognizing

our discursive tactics as autobiographical. Insisting on transcendent,
reified disciplinary authority leaves us vulnerable to domination by
consent to the ideology of professionalism. And that ideology, like the
journalistic will to truth that Liu examines, functions as "a key mecha
nism in regulating the deployment and movement of human resources in
contemporary rhetorical practices" (316). However, and as we shall see,

recognizing?indeed, foregrounding?the emergent, fleeting, and tac
itly autobiographical authority of our discursive community could facili

tate the professional exigencies of generating knowledge. We need such
discursive practices to support the mission of subverting the dominant

(masculinist, oppressive) paradigm and yet maintain our mission to
profess English; we need a discourse that facilitates the production of, but
not the passive consumption of, the products of the dominant culture.

Such facilitation in our scholarly enterprise is crucial to using the
workplace as a site for converting hegemonic practices to a force that
effects change. Clearly, we must recognize and self-consciously inscribe
specifically the autobiographical composition of our authority as pro
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fessionals. We must feature the rhetoricity of our discursive practice
and demonstrate its contextualized knowledge claims if we want our

work as professors of English to avoid the global pretensions of
hegemony.

Embodied Rhetoric's "Double Gesture"
To that end, I propose an embodied rhetoric that, in general terms,
involves a crucial shift in discursive practice and representation from our
conventional (mis)recognition of academic discourse as an impersonal,

detached, objective, structured presentation of clear positions, argu
ments, and evidence to a less-familiar but more rhetorical approach that

recognizes academic discourse as a result?a process not a product, an
epiphenomenon if you prefer?of the discursive practice of academics.
In specific terms and conventions, embodied academic discourse requires
gestures to the material practices of the professional group and to the
quotidian circumstances of the individual writer. Such gestures would
allow us to work under the cover of professional expertise and to the ends

of what Michel de Certeau calls "the ordinary," those practices of
"everyday [wo]man" who uses clever tactics of improvisation to outma
neuver the discipline of institutions (13). This supplemental tactic that I
propose could acknowledge the conflicting functions of a professional
academic: a guardian of cultural capital disciplined by the conventions of
professional practice and a cultural critic committed to revealing and
decentering hegemonic domination of access to power and knowledge. It
could likewise acknowledge the logical contradiction that Fish notes in
compositionists' persistent attempts to argue for a "pedagogical payoff

in being opposed to anti-foundationalism and?by implication?to link
theory with practice at all (335). Embodied rhetoric allows such contra
diction, for it crosses the ideologically constituted line demarcating a
logical separation between theory and practice. Instead, it generates a

both/and professional ideology that recognizes the conditions of its
construction.

Let's look more carefully, then, at how we might refigure our
professional discourse such that it attends to our own textual mechanics

and avows authority in our practice as professionals rather than only in
disciplinary, abstracted descriptions and interpretations of ourselves as
writers and scholars, experts in the field. We've seen that in order to
recognize the ways we conceal our self-proclaimed authority we must
gesture to the contexts and intentions of our practice. Acknowledging the

autobiographically driven aspects of our work as professionals and as
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individual subjects is how we make our writing mat(t)er(ial). But how

do we do this?

We must gesture to our bodies, our lives. Jane Gallop's manifesto
Thinking Through the Body suggests a method for initiating such ges

tures. When Gallop describes her efforts as a professional reading
subject, she says, "I think through autobiography: that is to say, the chain
of associations that I am pursuing in my reading passes through things that

happened to me" (4). Likewise, as a professional academic writing
subject, I can mark my body's presence when I author(ize) texts by calling

to the surface at least some of the associations that my thinking passes
through, associations evoked by my gender, race, class, sexual orienta
tion, politics, and so on. Jacqueline Jones Royster says that she tries to
think and listen through her associations. The "me" that I want to think
through is not only someone who professes composition (who's recently
tenured but still needs to get published, who's committed to the feminist
enterprise of intervening in patriarchal disciplinarity, who' s a member of
a "stand alone" department struggling to prove its scholarly worth to a

large state university aspiring to become a more notable research institu

tion); she's also a forty-seven year old woman, a feminist partner, a
recovering alcoholic, a sister, a daughter, a stepdaughter, a landscape
painter, an ex-wife, and on and on. These sites of my body authorize

my texts, for the language I use entextualizes these associations
regardless of whether or not I recognize (or even privilege) that

process.

Lest listeners immediately evoke the "essentialism" bandwagon, let

me hasten to point out that these particular embodiments and their
individual entextualizations are by no means fixed for any one group or
even any one individual; in fact, these associations, what Stuart Hall calls

"connotational chains," can be interrupted. True, my body?like my
profession?is undeniably implicated in ideological discourses. True?
and as Hall argues?it's no easy task to change the associations. On the
other hand, Hall says,
It is by no means adequately proven that these positionings alone
constitute the mechanisms whereby all individuals locate themselves in
ideology. We are not entirely stitched into place in our relation to the

complex field of historically situated ideological discourses exclu
sively at that moment alone.... We remain open to be positioned and
situated in different ways, at different moments throughout our

existence. (106)
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According to Hall, then, I?anyone?can simultaneously occupy
various and perhaps even contradictory positions. Invoking W.E.B. Du
Bois' The Souls of Black Folk, Royster refers to this capacity as deciding
one's "rhetorical purpose to be to cross, or at least to straddle boundaries

with the intent of shedding light" (34). In other words, I can make the
choice to pledge allegiance to different ideologically inscribed positions
at different times, choose which of the various positions that I occupy at
any given historical moment will best define me in a given context. These
multiple choices provide the agency and the myriad locations I need to

resist containment and co-optation by uninspected?that is,
misrecognized?ideologies.

In order to realize fully the material and therefore fugitive authority

of these rhetorical choices within my disciplinary discourse, an embodied

professional rhetoric should recognize and acknowledge how I as author

and my profession as discipline self-authorize; in other words, such
discourse must recognize and utilize autobiographical evidence and
stylistics. As an embodied rhetorician, I accomplish this autobiographical
aspect of my "data" by drawing attention to?and subsequently destabi

lizing?the sanctioned gestures informing its "mastery" as a profes
sional. My embodied rhetoric further recognizes the authority of my

personal, individual autobiography by gesturing to the chain of
associations motivating my discourse. Such an approach to our own
academic discourse proves not only more candid and less elitist, but
also more potent because it recognizes and professes the situatedness
of our practice.
It would seem, then, that the language of the ordinary person
inscribing his or her everyday life, the language of autobiography, may

well provide the most effective means of recognizing and subverting
hegemonic discursive conventions. For, as de Certeau contends, "To
discuss language 'within' ordinary language, without being able 'to
command a clear view' of it, without being able to see it from a distance,

is to grasp it as an ensemble of practices in which one is implicated and
through which the prose of the world is at work" (11-12). To grasp our

discourse as "an ensemble of practices"?or, in Foucauldian terms, "to
restore to discourse its character as an event"?an embodied rhetorician

who wants to maintain his or her professional obligations must fore
ground more than his or her professional "positionality" (129). That
particular discursive gesture has become so commonplace that it' s lost its

subversive force in all but the most elaborated of examples. (For an
effective example, see Lu's "Critical Affirmation," which presents three
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extensive "instances" of Lu's positionality as Asian, as [privileged]
Asian immigrant and researcher.) Instead, and in order to author a
subversive ordinary language, I must also foreground my own autobiog

raphy. I do so by making my scholarly writing "personal" in a very
particular way: I stage the authority of my expertise and simultaneously

expose it as a rhetorical pose, a gesture, an authority presumed by the
autobiography of my profession and of myself as a particular author of

multiple positions.
Nancy Miller's notion of "personal criticism" best describes this
specific kind of autobiography, a discourse that not only reveals its
internal signature in passages that "invoke that moment in writing when

everything comes together in a fraction of poise" but also fosters the

"reclaiming of theory: turning theory back on itself (6, 5). Miller
explains that the personal in these texts is "at odds with the hierarchies of

the positional." What's more, she claims,
By turning its authorial voice into spectacle, personal writing theorizes

the stakes of its own performance: a personal materialism. Personal
writing opens an inquiry on the cost of writing... . [It] blows the cover
of the impersonal as a masquerade of self-effacement... and points to the

narcissistic fantasy that inheres in the poses of self-sufficiency we
identify with Theory; notably, those of abstraction. (24, 25)

What Miller describes as the "poses of self-sufficiency" emerge from
what I earlier described as the requisite discursive gestures that system
atically and systemically reroute professional discursive authority from
everyday practices and corporeal selves to an already constituted abstract

realm of disciplinary subjects, linguistic patterns, and texts. I also
described, in addition to abstraction, other masculinist poses of self
sufficiency that chronicle our fantasy about the nature of academic
discourse?notably, those of coherence, method(ology), clarity, consis
tency, impartiality, and, most importantly, rationality. Such poses may

sustain our professional status, but they remain impotent to recognize
what I've called the self-professed, self-constructed, self-affirmed, self
administered composition of academic discourse.
The vigor of the particular form of professional personal writing that

I am calling "embodied rhetoric" emerges from its recognition that
disciplinary knowledge, like autobiographical authority, is contingent on
disciplinary context, on ever-shifting, transient, emergent events that can
never be contained, complete, structured. When our discourse implies a
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coherent, autonomous, unified body of disciplinary knowledge, we
misrecognize or disavow the authority in which that knowledge is
grounded. An embodied rhetoric, however, celebrates this discontinuity.
Such an aspect of discursive authority, Benstock claims,
might be the most interesting aspect of the autobiographical: the measure
to which "self and "self-image" might not coincide, can never coincide

in language . . . because certain forms of self-writing . . . have no
investment in creating a cohesive self over time. Indeed, they seem to
exploit difference and change over sameness and identity: their writing

follows the "seam" of the conscious/unconscious where boundaries

between internal and external overlap. (148)

Benstock defines that "seam" as "the space of difference, the gap that the

drive toward unity ofselfcan never entirely close.. .the space of writing."
She further characterizes autobiography as "a coming together of method
[writing] and subject matter [self-hood]," a method that "reveals gaps,
and not only gaps in time and space or between the individual and the
social, but also a widening divergence between the manner and matter of
its discourse" (146). For us as professionals, this coming together of our

discursive matter and method is crucial to our success as professors of
academic discourse because it demystifies the nature of our professional
expertise; facilitates more sincere, straightforward professional author
ity; and subverts the totalizing effects of the hierarchies of disciplinarity.

Embodied rhetoric could indeed facilitate that kind of professional
success. However, in order to exploit autobiographical authority' s unique
capacity to "reveal gaps" in the manner and matter of my professional
writing, I must not attempt to write my (professional) life or my body (of
knowledge) as a unified whole. By the same token, I need not?in fact,

should not?construct a binary opposition between my organic "real" self

and my traditional, dispassionate, disembodied?and therefore ulti
mately essentialized?professional self. As Royster explains this point,
"all my voices are authentic" (37). Thus, in order to maintain my
discursive professionalism and simultaneously resist disciplinarity, I
must utilize what Shirley Neuman calls the "poetics of difference" that

emerges from an autobiographical discourse that accommodates the
specificity and the possible agency of the subject/author of discourse.

"Such a subject," Neuman explains, "is neither the unified subject of
traditional theory of autobiography nor the discursively produced and
dispersed subject of poststructuralist theory_It is a complex, multiple,
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layered subject with agency in the discourses and the worlds that
constitute the referential space of his or her autobiography, a self not only

constructed by differences but capable of choosing, inscribing, and
making a difference" (225). Here we see, at last, the crux of Benstock's
claim that "the question of'genre' often rides on the question of gender,"

since the notion of carefully circumscribed and clearly demarcated
boundaries between "self and other is a gendered one (148). When she
and other feminist theorists of women's autobiography incorporate
difference into earlier, masculinist notions of autobiography (such as
Gusdorf s) as an attempt to construct a unified and unique self, they
demonstrate that such a limited understanding of that genre does not
account for authors whose reflections in the cultural hall of mirrors does

not reflect unique or unified individuals.

Susan Friedman?expanding on Sheila Rowbotham's Woman's
Consciousness, Man's World?explains how women's experience of self
does not (necessarily) include the privilege of conceiving of oneself as
isolate or individual: "A woman cannot, Rowbotham argues, experience
herself as an entirely unique entity because she is always aware of how
she is being defined as woman, that is, as a member of a group whose
identity has been defined by the dominant male culture" (75). Friedman
writes, "Not recognizing themselves in the reflections of cultural repre

sentations, women develop dual consciousness," a sense of self that
"directly parallels W.E.B. Du Bois' identification of a dual conscious

ness for blacks living in a dominant white culture" (75, 76). Such a
separation affects women's discursive representations of themselves,
Friedman explains, creating a powerful "poetics of difference" in women's

autobiography: "Cultural representations of woman lead not only to
women's alienation, but also to the potential for a 'new consciousness'
of self. . . . Not recognizing themselves in the reflections of cultural
representation, women develop a dual consciousness?the self as cultur
ally defined and the self as different from cultural prescription" (75). For

women autobiographers, she continues, this sense of self and group
identity is dually inscribed in "an identity that is not purely individualis

tic" or "purely collective" (76).
Notice how this explanation of a self that is made possible by shifting

what we recognize as an autobiographical act is much like the shift in

gesture that I've suggested we academics can make possible by
foregrounding the self-constructed aspects of our professional authority.

For us as academic professionals, such a dually inscribed identity could
give rise to a less-disciplined, more autonomous but nonetheless profes
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sionally sanctioned scholar. If we attend to the lessons found in Friedman's

analyses of women autobiographers, we see that inscribing such an
identity must originate from feeling and in the body: "Alienation from the

historically imposed image of the self is what motivates the writing, the
creation of an alternate self in the autobiographical act. Writing the self

shatters the cultural hall of mirrors and breaks the silence imposed by

male speech" (76). For my purposes, however, it is crucial to amend
Friedman's description: I want to use the term "masculinist" rather than
"male," for the self reflected in our professional culture's hall of mirrors

and its requisite silence can be (indeed, often has been for me anyway)

imposed by females' as well as males' masculinist speech; likewise, a
male may be just as alienated from the profession's historically imposed
image of self as I often am.

In other words, in the case of the professional academic, a felt
dissonance is what provides discursive inspiration for the type of personal

criticism that I am proposing: an awareness of an essential(ist) tension
between what I say and what I do as a professional, between what I must

do because I am disciplined by the profession's conventions and what I
can say even as I write about disciplinary matters like, say, facilitating
agency and decentering hegemonic conventions; that tension is what
provokes my words. Such a complex, even contradictory, discursive
identity can be acknowledged in an embodied professional discourse, for
a discourse that gestures to conventional disciplinary authority and to
professional practice reveals the "gaps" between what I say and what I do;
such discourse could shatter the mystery of academic authority and the
professed coherence of professional identity.

As Friedman proposes in her account of women autobiographers'
"awareness of the meaning of the cultural category WOMAN," I am
proposing rhetorical moves that acknowledge dominant categories ("dis
ciplinary knowledge" and "professor") and undermine their authority.
This turning of disciplinary authority back on itself as a form of resistance

is made possible when we simultaneously gesture to the transient and
contextual self and to the authority constructed in the act of writing. The
writingprocess' capacity to formally indicate butnotpossessnondiscursive

activities enables this simultaneous gesturing. As Neuman explains,
This complex... process of inventing a self in autobiographies by women

or in poetics of women's autobiography is often defined as a double
gesture by which the narrator presents herself or is read as culturally
defined as a woman and as "different from cultural prescription," as both
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the product of social discourse and as individual. . . . [T]he quest for
individual autonomy without renouncing a collective identity... emerges
as a structure that is modified, but not abandoned. (218; emphasis added)

The academic version of such a "double gesture," as you may recall,

involves staging the authority of professional expertise and simulta
neously exposing it as a pose. In other words, in the act of invoking
disciplinary authority by making the requisite gesture to the abstract
realm of disciplinary knowledge, I as writer undermine its authority by

self-consciously noting my disciplined, discursive performance and
likewise gesturing to the material dominion of my personal and/or
professional life. That is, I point to myself as a constructed professional

and myself as an autonomous professional, myself as professional disci

plinarian, and myself as democratic individual. The duality without
duplicity of this gesture restores not j ust sincerity and agency but body to

my professional discourse.

Articulating New Paradigms
What I wanted to do was to tell you the story of how I came to recognize
much of what I discuss herein, especially the point about the hostility to

rhetoric inherent in our professional discursive practices. In fact, an
earlier version of this essay did begin by describing a discussion between

graduate students and me when we read Stanley Fish's "Anti
foundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composition" in our

Research Methods in Rhetoric and Composition course. My students'
questions brought into sharp relief the otherwise ill-defined ideological

conflicts inherent in the profession's (my) endorsement of Fish's
argument(s) and its (my) self-definitions. In that course, we'd read
various compositionists' arguments favoring anti-foundationalist stances,

in particular Stephen North's chapters on practitioners, chapters in
Contending with Words, and Patricia Bizzell's specific explanation of

anti-foundationalism's value to pedagogy. When we then read a
counterargument, Fish's "Anti-foundationalism," my students were out
raged. I paraphrase their reactions:
If Stanley Fish already proved?and that was several years ago?that
practice has nothing to do with theory, then why do people keep trying to
prove that it does? So many of the research methods we've studied and

even your advice to us as fledgling researchers all focus on an application
of theory to the composition classroom; most of the articles we've read,
even the abstract theoretical ones, seem to require an "application to the
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classroom" section. If everybody already knows?because Stanley Fish
said it?that there' s no logical connection between theory and pedagogy,
then why do they keep on trying to find one? What's up with that? Are
they just stupid? Don't they read him? If they disagree with him, why
don't they say so directly rather than just ignore him? What's the point of

people writing all these articles if everyone apparently ignores them

anyway?
Earlier, I wanted to follow that episode by describing at length my
subsequent process of scrutinizing Fish's rhetoric in that article as well

as in his examinations of anti-professionalism and the professional
practice of blind submission. My earlier draft's analysis of that rhetoric

was meant to demonstrate Fish's own contradictory moves: because he
relies on logic to make his point in "Anti-foundationalism," Fish engages
in the same anti-professional stance that he mocks in others. Berating J.
Hillis Miller's,Bizzell's, Robert Scholes' andothers' attempts to connect
anti-foundationalist theory with pedagogical practices and thereby dem

onstrate "that what they do can be justified or explained by a set of
principles that stands apart from their practice, by a theory," Fish enables

his logical superiority but disavows the exigencies of rhetorical practice

(354). What Fish's critique leaves unsaid, then, is that given their
rhetorical situation those compositionists "swerve" from the logical
consequences of anti-foundationalist theory because professionally they
cannot do otherwise: even when arguing that all knowledge is situated
and that therefore no rule or maxim can be detached from professional
practice, an academic must also argue that his or her particular maxim or
rule or insight is authorized by something other than his or her practice,

life, or self. Hence, what Fish criticizes as a logical contradiction is
simultaneously a rhetorical necessity. Further, as evidence of profes
sional discourse's ideological control of the flow of embodied rhetorical

resources, it demonstrates that professional discourse allows
compositionists to deny Fish's gesture to the logic of noncontradiction
but has disavowed or at least mystified any complementary gesture to the
rhetorical requirements of material discursive conditions.
That was the story I wanted to tell. But when in my earlier draft I made

the gesture to story?especially right off the bat and especially at
length?a professional's review advised me to "imagine, in other words,
a revised essay that did not feel it was necessary to dredge up Fish (Ugh?
are we still mired in the foundationalism/anti-foundationalism debate?)."
Even for the reviewer who appreciated my story, the narrative got in the
way of my point: "The earlier discussions of Fish were interesting, but I
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kept wondering why you were spending so much time on him_I kept
wondering how Fish's article was attached to current scholarly conver
sations and to your definition of embodied rhetoric."
I give you these two examples primarily to answer what I anticipate

as a very reasonable objection you may have: why does someone arguing
for an embodied professional rhetoric write such?more or less?disem
bodied prose?3 One reason is that it's difficult to get professional readers

to engage in what Krista Ratcliffe calls "rhetorical listening," a method
of listening (or in this case "reading") in ways that "promote a feminist

literacy": it's unfamiliar and therefore difficult to read (195). From
readers grown accustomed to conventional discursive practices, it beck
ons responses like this one from yet a third reviewer: "What I love about
[other autobiographers] is that they don't trivialize their autobiographi
cally grounded rhetoric by presenting it as a 'gesture.'" Similarly, it is
difficult?for me anyway?to write embodied professional rhetoric well:
in trying to use conventional rhetoric to establish ethos and credibility to
authorize embodied rhetoric, I make many mistakes. I take too long to get
to the point, apparently unable to stay within the conventional article
length of twenty or so pages. I often don't cite the most appropriate
representations of current scholarly debate (I cannot necessarily control

or predict the sites of the debates that animate me, that invoke my
embodied responses). I don't explain myself very well (of course I didn't
want to dredge up the foundationalism/anti-foundationalism debate. The

essay "Anti-foundationalism" is merely the site of my own and my
students' irritation and of my later rhetorical analysis; otherwise, its
content is irrelevant to my purpose here. Furthermore, I believe that

acknowledging my discourse as a series of rhetorical moves neither
undermines nor disowns it: gesturing to my own body or life story no more

trivializes it than the announcement, "By the authority invested in me

by the state of_" undermines the authority of a person allowed
to say, "I now pronounce you man and wife." The gesture directs
attention to the source of the authority, but it does not thereby
diminish that authority.)
Nonetheless (and here's another important reason why I gesture to
reviewers' reactions to my earlier draft), professional readers' reactions
can help me to focus my embodied professional discourse. For instance,
I discovered that, indeed, I can tell my "story" much more briefly, and in
doing so I rediscovered the point of embodying my argument. Proving
that Fish contradicts himself, too (or at least denies the material condi
tions of compositionists' professional discourse), is not what I want to
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foreground. No. What I do want my story to emphasize is how I felt during

my graduate students' and my discussion of Fish's article and how those
feelings shaped my multiple responses. I was particularly animated by
these student reactions: "If everybody already knows?because Stanley

Fish said it?that there's no logical connection between theory and
pedagogy, then why do they keep on trying to find one? What's up with
that? Are they just stupid? ... What's the point of all these articles?" My
visceral responses were many. My flushed, hot skin and my quickened

heart rate brought to light my undeniable but not publicly expressed
feelings: anger ("No, they're not 'stupid,' you arrogant jerks. And who
are you to think that you know more than the experts? You're the students

here."); fear ("Geez, these guys are right. We do look pretty stupid, don't
we? These students see this better than I do."); and shame ("I don't know
why we write all that stuff except that we have to in order to keep our jobs.

How ridiculous is that! Why have I chosen such an absurd way to make

a living?").
I imagine my students could see my flush and make assumptions
about its source, but what they heard (I think) was my jarring laugh
followed by my careful explanation: "While I can understand how the
situation appears ridiculous to you, I can tell you that the reason that
compositionists persist in connecting theory and practice is that it's part
of the job. We do it because we have to." Thus, a further important aspect

of my story is its demonstration of the rhetorical choices I made in
distinguishing which responses would be private, which public. My
voiced response at the time of the event embodies the effects of
disciplinarity, the ways that even "what we take to be the most private and

personal of phenomena?emotion and the body?are effects of social
organization and are made available for public administration through the

techniques of discipline" (Worsham, "Rhetoric" 397). I felt frustrated
and fettered by my own public response, however, probably because
"that's the way we've always done it" responses to my own legitimate
intellectual inquiries have always enraged me. To my own dismay, I saw
that I'd become?or at least acted like?one of the "because I'm the Mom

and I said so" authority figures I'd always abhorred, someone who
preferred to subdue rather than empower intellectual curiosity. I'd seen
the "enemy" and it was I. This "alienation from the historically imposed

image of the self is what motivate[d] the writing" of an embodied,
multiply-motivated self: immediately after class, I wrote up much of my
earlier draft's analysis of Fish's rhetoric, searching for the position that

would "break the silence imposed by male speech" (Friedman 76). I read
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more Fish than I ever had before; I also felt quite confident in challenging

him on at least this one point.
Clearly, then, my story is also important because it exemplifies the
way our discipline "works at both the semantic and affective levels to
produce and organize knowledge and experience" (Worsham, "Rhetoric"

397). In later discussions in that same graduate course?discussions
focused usually on articles in Contending with Words?I often cited to
students their reactions to Fish's article as an example of what Worsham
and Vitanza might mean when they point out the necessity of alternative

rhetorics in composition studies. Needless to say, an example that they'd

generated themselves facilitated their comprehension. To be quite hon
est, my students' earlier questions and my subsequent analysis of Fish's
rhetorical moves facilitated my own understanding of those authors' calls
for difference and rhetoricity in professional discourse. Thus, the mate

rial conditions in our classroom obviously resulted in, among other
things, this essay; my feelings at the time produced and organized my
professional process of producing knowledge. Most importantly, without

my students' unprofessional?that is, not controlled by professional
ideology?responses, I may not have seen and certainly would not have

understood as well the crucial, rhetorical, and embodied connection
between my own theory and practice.
I hope, then, that we can now agree in our answers to the following
question, one previously posed by Yumeng Liu:
Shall we work toward relaxing the prohibitive "procedures" [of discur
sive practices] and facilitating an ever freer flow of rhetorical resources,
or shall we continue to impose a restrictive regime in the name of political
commitment, ethical integrity, or ideological probity, even at the cost of
a rhetorical study or theory divorced from what is going on rhetorically
in the actual world, and unable to exert much material impact on it? (325)
I hope, too, that I've been able in this short time to elucidate how feminist

theorists' explanations of autobiographical gestures' capacity to ac
knowledge ideological cultural representations and simultaneously au
thorize writers' material contexts suggest an alternative rhetoric. Further,

I trust that I've demonstrated the radical potential of such feminist
discourse to elude the problematics of an insincere avowal of a continu

ous self and to subvert hegemonic and/or essentialist definitions of
identity. Finally, I hope I've convinced you theoretically and perhaps
practically that similar use of autobiographical gestures in our own
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professional academic discourse may well resolve the tensions inherent
in our personal and professional identities and facilitate our construction
of a self and a profession more autonomous, less unified.
If so, then you are apt to see, as Michel de Certeau does, that the
language of an ordinary person inscribing his or her everyday life may

well provide a more effective means of recognizing and subverting
hegemonic discursive conventions than our specialized, conventional,
professional language has provided. In The Practice of Everyday Life, de
Certeau tells us that unlike the "Expert's discourse," the ordinary person's

inscription of his or her own everyday practice "does not profit from
knowledge by exchanging it against the right to speak in its name; he [or
she] retains its exactingness but not its mastery" (13). He writes,
This is no longer the position of professionals, supposed to be civilized
men among savages; it is rather the position which consists in being a
foreigner at home, a "savage" in the midst of ordinary culture_[S]ince
one cannot find another place from which to interpret it_since, in short
there is no way out, the fact remains that we are foreigners on the inside?

but there is no outside. (13-14)

And since there is no outside?no reified Knowledge or Truth from
which we can speak as experts or even as wholly completed selves?then
recognizing ourselves carousing on the inside, noticing ourselves basking
at that center and turning it out for all to see (in other words, authorizing
the practice of our everyday professional life) is the way that we can attain

a "fraction of poise," gain local knowledge, and resist being always
already inscribed by the language we compose.4

San Diego State University

San Diego, California

Notes
1. Though the "genre" I discuss is our own professional discourse, I
recognize that the status of academic discourse as a discrete "genre" is neither
undisputed nor unified. Given, however, my fairly cohesive audience of rhetoric
and composition specialists and given my further qualification that?for my

particular purposes here?what I mean by professional academic discourse is
the sort of writing typically published in our disciplinary journals, I trust that

readers will invoke relatively consistent notions of the kind of prose I am
talking about.
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2. What may be distinctive of us as professional academics is that we
additionally and simultaneously insist on touting ourselves as facilitators of
democratic access to the sites of our professional power and knowledge. Thus,
for those of us who profess rhetoric and composition, a most disingenuous but
seductive avowal is our telling ourselves?as Bizzell has told us?that "our task

is ... to share a discourse" (262).
3. For an example of my own embodied professional rhetoric, see "Making."
4.1 gratefully acknowledge Krista Ratcliffe's reading of an earlier version

of this draft (especially her gracious willingness to be accountable for her
"blind" review by signing it). Her insights?particularly in distinguishing
between a rhetorical and logical connection of ideas?greatly facilitated my
naming my point and getting to it. Thank you, Krista, for your excellent
rhetorical listening.
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